

Dear Congressman Waxman,

I wrote you on Friday, May 3, 2007, on the spur of the moment, after reading on-line that you had invited Tenet the week before to testify. So that you could question Tenet about details, I wrote quickly and sent my letter immediately. Late in the day I realized that I had overlooked mentioning a number of very important points. While I will later remember more events that are relevant to your considerations, I want to add those that are nagging at the back of my mind now.

First off, I stated in the first paragraph that I had been asked to evaluate what WMDs Iraq had, starting in about 1989, but then neglected to go into the specifics of that first request. I feel that it is important to be clear about the context in which I did this first viewing on Iraq's nuclear issue. That request was made by DCI Webster as part of a general request to remote view the world, including the USSR, for nuclear weapon's treaty violations. That survey did not include chemical or biological weapons. I wrote a report based on my remote viewing which pinpointed areas of concern for the CIA to investigate further, or used weapon's inspectors, where possible, to do so. Remote viewing is a good first guess, that requires substantiation by other means. Most intelligence requires confirmation by other methods before one puts too much credence in it. That includes so called hard methods like satellite images.

I found many areas of the world in which I considered it likely, from a remote viewing perspective, that important nuclear treaty violations were occurring. About 46 of those I considered top-priority for the CIA to investigate. and marked on maps their locations when it was not just a policy issue. There were about 132 low-priority violations that I was concerned about. Two of those were in Iraq. CIA analysts had already uncovered about half of the violations I mentioned , but as I did not have their reports at the time, I listed them in my report. Most of my report dealt with the USSR and China. The two violations that I was concerned could have occurred in Iraq were barely more than noting two locations on a map for the CIA to check. Both locations were factories. In my opinion, neither had nuclear weapons ready to use in them, but they had the intention to work in towards developing nuclear weapons and had made preliminary steps in that direction. I judged those violations of the Non-proliferation Treaty to be low-priority because there appeared to be little risk of Iraq testing a nuclear weapon in the next few years.

Next, I want to clarify the circumstances surrounding the shipment of arms from the CIA to Iraq that Hussein ordered to invade Kuwait. Hussein had ordered arms from the CIA many times before, including for the Iraq-Iran war. He had a CIA officer assigned to him to meet his needs. That is, the only job of that CIA officer was to make sure the Hussein had all of his needs for weapons met, within some constraints. I happened to see that officer in the CIA one day and asked him if he was selling nuclear technology to Iraq, because I had written that world report and remembered Iraq in it. He did not give me a very straight answer. It aroused my suspicions that the CIA was violating the Non-Profleration treaty in what it was selling Iraq. I didn't have time to look into it further at the time; it was still a low-priority issue for me. But some weeks to months later I ran into that same CIA officer and asked him again. This time he admitted that he was in the

process of getting ready to send a rather large shipment of arms to Iraq. This was probably in about the Fall of 1989. I didn't like the tone of what he told me. I felt that he was trying to pull the wool over my eyes and secretly gloating inside that he had done so. At that point, I remotely viewed what that shipment of arms consisted of. Then I went down to the arms shipping section and looked at the invoice. The invoice did not match what I viewed remotely, so I went the next step and examined the Iraq file in that department. That was when I first saw how much chemical and biological warfare agents the CIA had listed as "shipped already" and "shipment pending". I did not like what I saw. I didn't think that it was safe to sell Iraq biological weapons, especially not biological agents that the US had no vaccine for. That was foolhardy because infections travel the globe quickly via airplanes and vaccines can take years to develop. So, as a physician I was outraged that these had been sold to Iraq and some were listed also as "shipment pending". I seriously feared that the policy makers authorizing the sales lacked adequate advice, understanding, and caution regarding these virulent infectious agents. The plague had killed a third of major parts of Europe when it had swept through centuries ago. The flu at the end of WWI had killed some 20 million people or more. To sell Ebola virus to anyone, a virus that the US had no anti-viral medication and no vaccine to contain, seemed to me a criminal act on a very grand scale. It was because of the Ebola virus listed on the "shipment pending" list, that I became committed to dealing with the shipment that was due to sail in about 2 days. From the documents it was not entirely clear that the Ebola was loaded in that shipment. It could have been held to go into the next shipment of arms about 2 weeks later. I was also upset to see Small Pox listed on the "Shipped Already" list. According to my remote viewing, the Bio-warfare packages contained live virus, not killed or even attenuated virus as could be used to make a vaccine. If the US had wanted to make a vaccine from that material, shipping it to Iraq was not the correct first step.

I was pretty sure that the US had treaty commitments not to sell either of those agents to any country and especially not to a dictator who had used chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran war. The bio-warfare agents were as dangerous as a nuclear weapon. The US were not even supposed to have them in their own labs except to make vaccines with. To sell them as weapons, which is how they were listed on the invoices was a clear violation of the Biological Weapons Conventions Treaty. About that point in the shipping dept, I was furious. I picked up the phone and called the Director of the Center for Disease Control (CDC's) office and asked to speak to their expert on the Biological Weapon's Treaty. They at first said that they didn't have one and when I pressed the matter they forwarded my call to a Biological Weapons Lab. That meant that I ended up talking to a CIA officer out on the "back 40 acres" of the CIA's Langley grounds at that Lab. He was not happy to speak to me and insisted that he couldn't do so. I "pulled rank" on him and asked him to come to my office with the sections of that treaty that would allow the sale of Ebola and Small Pox to another country. There was no such section and he never showed up. I went over to his office and confronted him about it because by then I had found a document that showed he had "signed off" on allowing the sale of those agents to foreign governments. I showed him his signature on the document and demanded an explanation. He said "that is the way we have always done it here at the CIA". I then filed a formal inquiry request into the matter with the DDCI's office. That required filling in about 3 pages of trick questions designed to make sure that no inquiry ever happens. It is not very subtle; above where you sign your name at the end you have to accept a possible lawsuit

against you, jail time, and legal fees of whatever the CIA decides to levee against you if the "complaint is unfounded". I asked to see the small print on that. Looking at it in the secretary's office, I found that a compliant is defined as "unfounded" when a hearing panel decides it to be. It has nothing to do with facts or evidence. My listing my complaint as "the CIA has listed Ebola and Small Pox as agents to be shipped to Iraq" on the shipping invoice, while I could show that on the CIA's own invoice, could not protect me from an "unfounded" decision. I was angry enough about the violation that I signed anyway. Later, the CIA fined me \$20,000 for filing that complaint. They did not even form a hearing panel and evaluate the evidence. They simply stamped the form "unfounded" and gave me a fine big enough to try to deter me from ever doing such a thing again. But I was not told about the fine until nearly 2 years later. By then the first Iraq ground war was just over. If anything the fine appeared to be a pre-emptive retaliation against me to try to prevent me from filing any complaints regarding how the first Iraq War was fought. Since I was told of the fine on the day I tried to file a compliant at the US base in Saudi, the timing of it was suspicious. (As an aside, the complaint that I tried to file was on what clearly appeared to be a war crime committed by a US military officer who had shot about 10 Iraqi prisoners in cold blood while they were tied up. There were witnesses to the shooting which I had found after remote viewing the incident. Most of those shot were Iraqi soldiers who had surrendered. But one was a teenage boy in regular clothes. After I filled out the form to report that incident, the form was torn up in front of me and I was told that I was fined \$20,000 for the earlier "unfounded" compliant.)

Having filed that first form, I then picked up a copy of the Iraqi arm sale contract and invoice, got in a taxi and went down to the dock to where the shipment was being loaded. Because the CIA was onto the fact that I was questioning that shipment to Hussein, they were trying to load the rest of it quickly and ship out before I could cause them trouble over it. When I got to the dock, I did manage after some hours of arguing, to get the box cars opened for my inspection. As a remote viewer, it was not so hard for me to know what I was looking for and which box cars it was in. The biological weapons were in the Captain's refrigerator, taking up about half of it. No warning other than "Refrigeration Required" had been placed on the boxes, or the refrigerator. That was in violation of US regulations. The Ebola was in those boxes. I was able to confirm that by the invoice attached to one of the boxes. There were 4 Bio-warfare agents total in the refrigerator. I made sure that they were taken off the ship and returned to the CIA's Bio-warfare lab at Langley. Officially there is no such lab on the grounds of the CIA's headquarters. Officially, most of the activities happening at CIA headquarters are not happening there. And officially, undercover assets, like myself, have never been there either.

The nuclear weapon's parts were in three separate box cars, in boxes that had invoices for other standard mechanical parts or no invoices at all. There were no radioactive materials found. The parts were related to the technology needed to ensure that the conventional explosives set off the nuclear chain reaction. That is, they were parts for a nuclear detonator. I was familiar with such parts because in the late 1980's I had spent a day in a nuclear detonator manufacturing plant as part of an assignment to recover a missing nuclear detonator. Since to recover the actual detonator I had made a non-functional look alike myself, I did have a pretty good understanding of what the parts looked like in a standard US one. The shipment did not appear to contain a whole

detonator. A modern nuclear detonator is not a large item and if the US had intended to sell Hussein one to use it, they probably would have sold it already assembled and complete. What I found was stray parts of ones, seeded in many different boxes containing standard parts. Someone was, in my opinion, setting Hussein up to frame for having WMD, not actually selling him nuclear detonators to use. Of course, as a physician the biological agents were within my field of expertise and the nuclear detonators were not. The many small parts of a nuclear detonator could have added up to one whole detonator to an engineer. But I really did not believe that they did, nor that that was the intention.

When I got those parts back to the CIA, I later had a visiting Princeton nuclear physicist with the appropriate clearance look at them. I asked him and not an analyst in the CIA because I wanted an informed and independent opinion. He agreed with my assessment, saying that it appeared to be scrap from a detonator factory as there were many deformed parts where the plastic was not stamped well by a mold. The total volume of these small detonator parts was about 2 cubic meters. They are not wrapped up neatly like other parts were and they were not labeled. An informed person would not have known that they were nuclear detonator parts. Had they been shipped they would have ended up in factories, laying around in the off chance that someday someone would figure out what equipment they fell off of and re-attach them. Then when the US invaded they would have been "found" and used to prove that Hussein was "close to making a nuclear bomb". As I previously mentioned those parts were not listed on the invoice. Nor were they on the list of items that Hussein had ordered as judged by the written notes of the CIA officer who was his supply agent.

Some of the parts had Russian words stamped into the black plastic to make them appear Russian in origin. I had to laugh when I read one of these, it had been stamped not with the notation "UP", but the Russian word for "Awful", just slightly different than the Russian word for "UP". It was clear that the CIA had stamped those Russian words into US products because some of the same parts had tiny "USA" embossing in raised lettering the size of a pencil lead. That took a magnifying glass to read, while the Russian stamping was crudely done in letters as big as possible, sometimes clearly destroying the utility of the part. The forgery as Russian parts was never intended to hold up to close scrutiny. It was the type of thing one would see hauled out before TV cameras by Pentagon officials for its propaganda effect as they advanced into Iraq.

I have more information to add on this topic, but it is late at night and it will have to wait. As the web-form for your committee probably takes only a few pages and as an "accident" could befall me tomorrow for starting to give you this information, I will send this portion now. That means that as I review things in my mind and organize the material I may contradict myself some as earlier unclear pieces become clearer. I ask for the committee to forgive me in advance for such discrepancy in details, as I am trying to convey the gist of what happened. The science of memory shows that eye-witness accounts are remarkably accurate for the gist of the events, but less good for peripheral details (see Memory, Trauma, and the Law by law professor Schefflin.) I am afraid that my memory is worse than many people's for dates and names, but often better than others for remembering conversations and events of importance to me. Please forgive my

awkward sentence structures, etc.; I have some minor brain damage acquired ?in the line of duty?. As an off-the-books veteran of many wars I also have generous amounts of PTSD. That includes a sense of a drastically foreshortened future, where I have trouble believing that I will live for more than another week before being killed by people who don't want the truth of war-profiteering to come out. But as I have had that sense of foreshortened future most of my life and I am still alive at age 54, perhaps ?"news of my death" is rather exaggerated? as the famous quote goes.

Sincerely,

Sue Arrigo, MD

Original web-form message with a few typos corrected: Sent May, 3, 2007

As a former Special Op Advisor to DCI Tenet, I would like to testify before your committee with respect to what was known about Iraq war intelligence before the invasion in 2003. Since I was a remote viewer with expertise in finding and recovering missing weapons, I was asked on several occasions in 1989 through 2004 to evaluate what WMDs Iraq had. Remote viewers are usually about 90% accurate (see the Seventh Sense by military remoter viewer Lyn Buchanan), and I had been a trainer in remote viewing since 1969. Each remote viewer is tracked for accuracy over time and their ratings published inside of military-intelligence. President Clinton declassified remote viewing in 1995. While my memory of the details may not be perfect, the gist of what I report below is correct.

The truth of CIA deceit is further complicated by the fact that the CIA sold Hussein arms to invade Kuwait. The contract on that shipment of weapons was one I looked at closely. The fine print gave Hussein a 10% discount if he would invade earlier, in the beginning of the 1990. Because nuclear weapons parts were not on the invoice, but I could "see" that they were packed into the crates, I went down to the dock and got them taken out. It was clear to me that the US was trying to frame Hussein as having nuclear weapons. That shipment of arms that included tanks and heavy artillery, did not reach Hussein in time for his invasion, even though he was "late" in launching it. It was "lost" at the US Navy's station in Naples for over a year.

In Iraq War #1, I was the CIA's remote viewing coordinator for intelligence starting a few days before the ground war and until it was over. During that time I was responsible for the remote viewing to check that the information that General Schwartzkopf got from the CIA was accurate. As the US ground forces pushed into Kuwait they uncovered chemical weapons that the US had sold to Hussein. Those reports went through my hands. Also, the interrogation reports on an Iraqi officer came across my desk in which he gave details about Iraq's WMDs. I was asked to confirm or deny what he said based on remote viewing. To confirm my viewing data, I tracked down at the CIA documents to confirm his allegations that the US had sold biological weapons to Hussein that any reasonable person would have objected to. Since I am a physician in my non-covert life, I was deeply concerned about the specifics of this sale. That sale occurred while Bush,

Sr. was President, and was not for the Iran–Iraq war that was already over. The timing of the private sale which Bush, Sr. had approved was the same as Hussein’s order of the arms which the CIA did know were ordered to invade Kuwait. I then checked further and found a CIA document that referenced a conversation with President Bush, Sr. It showed that he was aware, before he authorized the sale, of the risk that those biological weapons might be used against Kuwait. Puzzled that he authorized that sale, I was able to uncover in the CIA the name of the company selling the Bio–warfare agents. It was a company that had financial ties to a company owned by Bush, Sr. A 2.4 million dollar transfer of money between the two companies occurring on the day after Bush, Sr. made the authorization was highly suspicious as there had been no movement of money between the two companies in the preceding 8 months or so.

In about May of 1999, while Clinton was in office I was asked by the Council on Foreign Relations by way of DCCI McLaughlin to forecast the result of a US war in Iraq. I spent two months and wrote a 28 page report on my finding. In my conclusions, I listed an increased risk of nuclear war and of starting WWII as a reason that I advised against such an enterprise. That it was immoral to frame Iraq as having WMD by selling them to them first I listed in a footnote, because I couldn’t get it past the CIA reviewers any other way. That report was declassified in order to give it to the CFR.

The issue did not die. A few months later I was asked to re–submit my report with different conclusions. I spent almost 6 months on this second report. In it I included CIA statistics on the conventional weapons and WMDs that Hussein had, and my own remote viewed findings. Shortly after I submitted my report, Tenet still not liking my findings and recommendations not to go to war in Iraq, asked other remote viewers to research it. These were 3 of my students in remote viewing, and the students picked for the task were Yes–men, not competent viewers of good accuracy. I objected to this blatant attempt to get a report to substantiate a recommendation to go to war in Iraq, and wrote a memo to Clinton, Tenet, and the head of the JCS, and a few of the other military people that I thought should know the truth. I was then ordered by Tenet not to communicate with anyone without his permission. As Pentagon Generals consulted me about military forecasts as a matter of some routine, that communication ban did not hold up in practice. So, after my Yes–men students wrote a report supporting the Iraq War #2, a member of the JCS asked me to comment on it in writing. I did so, stating the accuracy ratings of those students of mine and pointing out verifiable errors that they had made. Those errors included saying that a particular plant in Iraq was close to making nuclear weapons. The inspectors were sent out and did not find out evidence that that was the case, even though the Yes–men students continued to say that was the case and had not changed any. A second unannounced visit by the inspectors again showed nothing suspicious. When the students were asked to specify where in the plant said weapon’s development was occurring they were unable to give a location. Normally a remote viewer can specify a location down to the accuracy on the map if the item in question is actually present. The likelihood that the weapons were not being developed there was thus very high, over 99% all told.

I was not asked to comment further on Iraq’s WMD until Bush, Jr. was in office. Shortly after he took office, I was asked again to revise my forecasts on a war with Iraq because my original report was viewed as a stumbling block at JCS. That was the case because I

have been used by the Pentagon since 1969 to forecast war plans and my accuracy in it was well-known and respected. This time the request came directly from the White House to Tenet and then to me. I updated at that time the charts on Hussein's known WMD per the CIA's analysts and then gave my own estimates. Hussein did have some modest stores of chemical weapons, slight stores of biological weapons, and no nuclear weapons capacity. The WMDs he had continued to be almost entirely ones that the US companies had sold him; over 94% of it authorized by the White House. Only 2.6% of the WMD came from Russia. So, during the time the US govt. had been asking me to fudge the data and say that Hussein should be overthrown in a war, they had been approving the sales and continuing to make a profit on them.

At that point, I contacted one of the weapons inspectors and told him where to go to pick up all the remaining WMDs, in the hopes of averting the war. The Iraqis had destroyed much of their arsenals already and what was left was new items they recently bought and a few items that they had lost track of and overlooked or had been stolen. After 2 months of work that was accomplished to my satisfaction. I then wrote a report with that inspector stating what WMDs had been seized, and my assurances that there were no more and a strongly worded statement recommending that he not be sold more of them. This then got me into some hot water, because I was interfering with the war party and the war-profiteering. That report was about in June 2001. There was adequate time before 911 for it to be reviewed. Again, when it was reviewed, it was overruled by Yes-men analysts.

Shortly, after Bush, Jr. returned to the White House after his extended vacation in August, I had an opportunity to go with Tenet to the White House on a different but related matter—the so-called terrorist threat. That is another can of worms that someday I hope the Congress will have the courage and circumstances to tackle investigations on. At that meeting I again stated my findings on Iraq. Namely, that Hussein was not a threat to the US if they did not make him one, and that it was wrong to set him and the US up for a war in order to make money and control the world's resources. At that meeting were Bush, Jr., Cheney, Rumsfeld, Tenet, and Rice as well as some generals from the Pentagon and the Army Chief of Staff. That meeting lasted a little over 2 hours. My Iraq "presentation" portion of it lasted about 12 minutes and contained slides of the charts that I had previously prepared. Right after I gave my talk, others presented their reports to counter mine. I was not allowed to rebut their claims although they were absurd and unsubstantiated.

Furious that the US planned to go to war based on these fraudulent reports, I wrote a detailed rebuttal of their presentations. I was ordered by Tenet not to send it to others at the meeting. One JCS member, the same one as before, pestered Tenet until Tenet gave him a copy. He was then fired from the JCS within a couple of days. Documents I reviewed from inside the CIA later showed that he had forwarded my rebuttal to all the members of that meeting. Furthermore, CIA documents revealed that all except Bush, Jr. had read most of my rebuttal and some of them had met days prior to 911 to figure out how to undermine my rebuttal. Again, they used Yes-men to produce new reports that were a towering stack of lies and faulty logic.

After 911, Tenet, the Bush administration, and the Pentagon were careful not to invite

me to any meetings where I might open my mouth. That continued until about Feb. 2002, when the White House requested that I research a topic related to the conduct of the Afghan war and present my findings to them. On that occasion, the meeting consisted largely of the same people, but the Army Chief of Staff was not feeling well and was not present. At that meeting, I again issued a brief warning that war with Iraq would increase the risk of nuclear war from 4.6% to 12.7% and that that could go higher the more protracted the war was. Let me make that a bit clearer. In forecasting the Iraq war outcome, I had divided the outcome according to which of their objectives they can try to achieve; liberation from Hussein and prompt return of the country to the Iraqis, war-profits, oil-profits, and permanent bases for "Full Spectrum Domination of the World". To get oil profits it was only necessary to make a deal with Hussein, not to go to war. To steal the oil outright, would require a war and continued occupation until a stable puppet government could be formed. I distinguished between all those possible objectives in my report because the expected outcomes were quite different. The worst outcome was not surprisingly if they attacked with the motivation to subjugate the Iraqis as part of a Full Spectrum Domination Policy. That was the only objective that required the building of permanent bases. The bases were built, the Iraqis were not happy and revolted. The risk of catastrophic fallout in the form of a nuclear war or WWII increased dramatically as a result of this attempt at tyranny at home and abroad.

I hope that you will call me to testify on this and other related matters. For example, in the couple of months before Tenet resigned I was a secret negotiator between Tenet and Cheney on who would take the fall for 911. That means I know a lot about 911 that I have not stated here. Then in August of 2004, Cheney insisted on giving me an off the books assignment to frame Iran as developing nuclear weapons. He wanted me to go to Iran as a physician and treat children on camera while an Iranian looking man rushed in to say he knew where the Iranians were developing nuclear weapons. Cheney admitted that the rest of it would be filmed in Hollywood. Like the Kuwaiti incubator baby story, it was a lie to kick off the war. I had to refuse because it was immoral.

There is much more that I could say on these matters but perhaps that is enough for now. No doubt the parties involved will try to deny that I was ever at the CIA. Indeed my relationship with the CIA has been complex over a period of many decades. I was an "undercover asset" and as such was at meeting not under my real name. I am no longer under cover, and I am willing to speak though it would be safest for me to do so from a distance. I am now residing in Ireland.

I have testified before Congressional Committees before such as before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee on Iran-Contra and on Senate Election rigging by the CIA in closed door sessions. I am not willing to testify again in a closed door session because nothing came out of those sessions except excessive risk to myself. The US administration invokes "national security" to cover up its high crimes. The US needs to be restored to a functional democracy. Thank you for doing the excellent work, along with Congressman Conyers to make that possible.

Sincerely, Sue Arrigo, MD

Former member of the AFIO (Assoc. of Former Intelligence Officers)

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