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The 9/11 Commission Report: A 571-Page Lie
by Dr. David Ray Griffin
Sunday, May 22, 2005
In discussing my second 9/11 book, The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions,
I have often said, only half in jest, that a better title might have
been "a 571-page lie." (Actually, I was saying "a 567-page lie,"
because I was forgetting to count the four pages of the Preface.) In
making this statement, one of my points has been that the entire Report is constructed in support of one big lie: that the official story about 9/11 is true.
Another point, however, is that in the process of telling this overall lie, The 9/11 Commission Report
tells many lies about particular issues. This point is implied by my
critique's subtitle, "Omissions and Distortions." It might be thought,
to be sure, that of the two types of problems signaled by those two
terms, only those designated "distortions" can be considered lies.
It is better, however, to understand the two terms as referring to
two types of lies: implicit and explicit. We have an explicit lie when
the Report claims that the core of each of the Twin Towers
consisted of a hollow steel shaft or when it claims that Vice President
Cheney did not give the shoot-down order until after 10:10 that
morning. But we have an implicit lie when the Commission, in its
discussion of the 19 alleged suicide hijackers, omits the fact that at
least six of them have credibly been reported to be still alive, or
when it fails to mention the fact that Building 7 of the World Trade
Center collapsed. Such omissions are implicit lies partly because they
show that the Commission did not honor its stated intention "to provide
the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11." They are
also lies insofar as the Commission could avoid telling an explicit lie
about the issue in question only by not mentioning it, which, I
believe, was the case in at least most instances.
Given these two types of lies, it might be wondered how many lies are contained in The 9/11 Commission Report.
I do not know. But, deciding to see how many lies I had discussed in my
book, I found that I had identified over 100 of them. Once I had made
the list, it occurred to me that others might find this summary
helpful. Hence this article.
One caveat: Although in some of the cases it is obvious that the
Commission has lied, in other cases I would say, as I make clear in the
book, that it appears that the Commission has lied. However, in the
interests of simply giving a brief listing of claims that I consider to
be lies, I will ignore this distinction between obvious and probable
lies, leaving it to readers, if they wish, to look up the discussion in
The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions. For ease in doing this, I have parenthetically indicated the pages of the book on which the various issues are discussed.
Given this clarification, I now list the omissions and claims of The 9/11 Commission Report that I, in my critique of that report, portrayed as lies:
1. The omission of evidence that at least six of the alleged
hijackers---including Waleed al-Shehri, said by the Commission probably
to have stabbed a flight attendant on Flight 11 before it crashed into
the North Tower of the WTC---are still alive (19-20).
2. The omission of evidence about Mohamed Atta---such as his
reported fondness for alcohol, pork, and lap dances---that is in
tension with the Commission's claim that he had become fanatically
religious (20-21).
3. The obfuscation of the evidence that Hani Hanjour was too poor a pilot to have flown an airliner into the Pentagon (21-22).
4. The omission of the fact that the publicly released flight manifests contain no Arab names (23).
5. The omission of the fact that fire has never, before or after 9/11, caused steel-frame buildings to collapse (25).
6. The omission of the fact that the fires in the Twin Towers were
not very big, very hot, or very long-lasting compared with fires in
several steel-frame buildings that did not collapse (25-26).
7. The omission of the fact that, given the hypothesis that the
collapses were caused by fire, the South Tower, which was struck later
than the North Tower and also had smaller fires, should not have
collapsed first (26).
8. The omission of the fact that WTC 7 (which was not hit by an
airplane and which had only small, localized fires) also collapsed---an
occurrence that FEMA admitted it could not explain (26).
9. The omission of the fact that the collapse of the Twin Towers
(like that of Building 7) exemplified at least 10 features suggestive
of controlled demolition (26-27).
10. The claim that the core of each of the Twin Towers was "a
hollow steel shaft"---a claim that denied the existence of the 47
massive steel columns that in reality constituted the core of each
tower and that, given the "pancake theory" of the collapses, should
have still been sticking up many hundreds of feet in the air (27-28).
11. The omission of Larry Silverstein's statement that he and the fire department commander decided to "pull" Building 7 (28).
12. The omission of the fact that the steel from the WTC buildings
was quickly removed from the crime scene and shipped overseas before it
could be analyzed for evidence of explosives (30).
13. The omission of the fact that because Building 7 had been
evacuated before it collapsed, the official reason for the rapid
removal of the steel---that some people might still be alive in the
rubble under the steel---made no sense in this case (30).
14. The omission of Mayor Giuliani's statement that he had received
word that the World Trade Center was going to collapse (30-31).
15. The omission of the fact that President Bush's brother Marvin
and his cousin Wirt Walker III were both principals in the company in
charge of security for the WTC (31-32).
16. The omission of the fact that the west wing of the Pentagon
would have been the least likely spot to be targeted by al-Qaeda
terrorists, for several reasons (33-34).
17. The omission of any discussion of whether the damage done to
the Pentagon was consistent with the impact of a Boeing 757 going
several hundred miles per hour (34).
18. The omission of the fact that there are photos showing that the
west wing's façade did not collapse until 30 minutes after the strike
and also that the entrance hole appears too small for a Boeing 757 to
have entered (34).
19. The omission of all testimony that has been used to cast doubt
on whether remains of a Boeing 757 were visible either inside or
outside the Pentagon (34-36).
20. The omission of any discussion of whether the Pentagon has a
anti-missile defense system that would have brought down a commercial
airliner---even though the Commission suggested that the al-Qaeda
terrorists did not attack a nuclear power plant because they assumed
that it would be thus defended (36).
21. The omission of the fact that pictures from various security
cameras---including the camera at the gas station across from the
Pentagon, the film from which was reportedly confiscated by the FBI
immediately after the strike---could presumably answer the question of
what really hit the Pentagon (37-38).
22. The omission of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's reference to "the missile [used] to damage [the Pentagon]" (39).
23. The apparent endorsement of a wholly unsatisfactory answer to
the question of why the Secret Service agents allowed President Bush to
remain at the Sarasota school at a time when, given the official story,
they should have assumed that a hijacked airliner might be about to
crash into the school (41-44).
24. The failure to explore why the Secret Service did not summon fighter jets to provide air cover for Air Force One (43-46).
25. The claims that when the presidential party arrived at the
school, no one in the party knew that several planes had been hijacked
(47-48).
26. The omission of the report that Attorney General Ashcroft was warned to stop using commercial airlines prior to 9/11 (50).
27. The omission of David Schippers' claim that he had, on the
basis of information provided by FBI agents about upcoming attacks in
lower Manhattan, tried unsuccessfully to convey this information to
Attorney General Ashcroft during the six weeks prior to 9/11 (51).
28. The omission of any mention of the FBI agents who reportedly
claimed to have known the targets and dates of the attacks well in
advance (51-52).
29. The claim, by means of a circular, question-begging rebuttal,
that the unusual purchases of put options prior to 9/11 did not imply
advance knowledge of the attacks on the part of the buyers (52-57).
30. The omission of reports that both Mayor Willie Brown and some
Pentagon officials received warnings about flying on 9/11 (57).
31. The omission of the report that Osama bin Laden, who already
was America's "most wanted" criminal, was treated in July 2001 by an
American doctor in the American Hospital in Dubai and visited by the
local CIA agent (59).
32. The omission of news stories suggesting that after 9/11 the US
military in Afghanistan deliberately allowed Osama bin Laden to escape
(60).
33. The omission of reports, including the report of a visit to
Osama bin Laden at the hospital in Dubai by the head of Saudi
intelligence, that were in tension with the official portrayal of Osama
as disowned by his family and his country (60-61).
34. The omission of Gerald Posner's account of Abu Zubaydah's
testimony, according to which three members of the Saudi royal
family---all of whom later died mysteriously within an eight-day
period---were funding al-Qaeda and had advance knowledge of the 9/11
attacks (61-65).
35. The Commission's denial that it found any evidence of Saudi funding of al-Qaeda (65-68).
36. The Commission's denial in particular that it found any
evidence that money from Prince Bandar's wife, Princess Haifa, went to
al-Qaeda operatives (69-70).
37. The denial, by means of simply ignoring the distinction between
private and commercial flights, that the private flight carrying Saudis
from Tampa to Lexington on September 13 violated the rules for US
airspace in effect at the time (71-76).
38. The denial that any Saudis were allowed to leave the United
States shortly after 9/11 without being adequately investigated
(76-82).
39. The omission of evidence that Prince Bandar obtained special permission from the White House for the Saudi flights (82-86).
40. The omission of Coleen Rowley's claim that some officials at
FBI headquarters did see the memo from Phoenix agent Kenneth Williams
(89-90).
41. The omission of Chicago FBI agent Robert Wright's charge that
FBI headquarters closed his case on a terrorist cell, then used
intimidation to prevent him from publishing a book reporting his
experiences (91).
42. The omission of evidence that FBI headquarters sabotaged the
attempt by Coleen Rowley and other Minneapolis agents to obtain a
warrant to search Zacarias Moussaoui's computer (91-94).
43. The omission of the 3.5 hours of testimony to the Commission by
former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds—-testimony that, according to her
later public letter to Chairman Kean, revealed serious 9/11-related
cover-ups by officials at FBI headquarters (94-101).
44. The omission of the fact that General Mahmoud Ahmad, the head
of Pakistan's intelligence agency (the ISI), was in Washington the week
prior to 9/11, meeting with CIA chief George Tenet and other US
officials (103-04).
45. The omission of evidence that ISI chief Ahmad had ordered $100,000 to be sent to Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11 (104-07).
46. The Commission's claim that it found no evidence that any
foreign government, including Pakistan, had provided funding for the
al-Qaeda operatives (106).
47. The omission of the report that the Bush administration
pressured Pakistan to dismiss Ahmad as ISI chief after the appearance
of the story that he had ordered ISI money sent to Atta (107-09).
48. The omission of evidence that the ISI (and not merely al-Qaeda)
was behind the assassination of Ahmad Shah Masood (the leader of
Afghanistan's Northern Alliance), which occurred just after the
week-long meeting between the heads of the CIA and the ISI (110-112).
49. The omission of evidence of ISI involvement in the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Reporter Daniel Pearl (113).
50. The omission of Gerald Posner's report that Abu Zubaydah
claimed that a Pakistani military officer, Mushaf Ali Mir, was closely
connected to both the ISI and al-Qaeda and had advance knowledge of the
9/11 attacks (114).
51. The omission of the 1999 prediction by ISI agent Rajaa Gulum Abbas that the Twin Towers would be "coming down" (114).
52. The omission of the fact that President Bush and other members
of his administration repeatedly spoke of the 9/11 attacks as
"opportunities" (116-17).
53. The omission of the fact that The Project for the New American
Century, many members of which became key figures in the Bush
administration, published a document in 2000 saying that "a new Pearl
Harbor" would aid its goal of obtaining funding for a rapid
technological transformation of the US military (117-18).
54. The omission of the fact that Donald Rumsfeld, who as head of
the commission on the US Space Command had recommended increased
funding for it, used the attacks of 9/11 on that very evening to secure
such funding (119-22).
55. The failure to mention the fact that three of the men who
presided over the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks—-Secretary
Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, and General Ralph Eberhart---were also
three of the strongest advocates for the US Space Command (122).
56. The omission of the fact that Unocal had declared that the
Taliban could not provide adequate security for it to go ahead with its
oil-and-gas pipeline from the Caspian region through Afghanistan and
Pakistan (122-25).
57. The omission of the report that at a meeting in July 2001, US
representatives said that because the Taliban refused to agree to a US
proposal that would allow the pipeline project to go forward, a war
against them would begin by October (125-26).
58. The omission of the fact that Zbigniew Brzezinski in his 1997
book had said that for the United States to maintain global primacy, it
needed to gain control of Central Asia, with its vast petroleum
reserves, and that a new Pearl Harbor would be helpful in getting the
US public to support this imperial effort (127-28).
59. The omission of evidence that some key members of the Bush
administration, including Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul
Wolfowitz, had been agitating for a war with Iraq for many years
(129-33).
60. The omission of notes of Rumsfeld's conversations on 9/11
showing that he was determined to use the attacks as a pretext for a
war with Iraq (131-32).
61. The omission of the statement by the Project for the New
American Century that "the need for a substantial American force
presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam
Hussein" (133-34).
62. The claim that FAA protocol on 9/11 required the time-consuming
process of going through several steps in the chain of command--even
though the Report cites evidence to the contrary (158).
63. The claim that in those days there were only two air force
bases in NORAD's Northeast sector that kept fighters on alert and that,
in particular, there were no fighters on alert at either McGuire or
Andrews (159-162).
64. The omission of evidence that Andrews Air Force Base did keep several fighters on alert at all times (162-64).
65. The acceptance of the twofold claim that Colonel Marr of NEADS
had to telephone a superior to get permission to have fighters
scrambled from Otis and that this call required eight minutes (165-66).
66. The endorsement of the claim that the loss of an airplane's
transponder signal makes it virtually impossible for the US military's
radar to track that plane (166-67).
67. The claim that the Payne Stewart interception did not show
NORAD's response time to Flight 11 to be extraordinarily slow (167-69).
68. The claim that the Otis fighters were not airborne until seven
minutes after they received the scramble order because they did not
know where to go (174-75).
69. The claim that the US military did not know about the hijacking
of Flight 175 until 9:03, when it was crashing into the South Tower
(181-82).
70. The omission of any explanation of (a) why NORAD's earlier
report, according to which the FAA had notified the military about the
hijacking of Flight 175 at 8:43, was now to be considered false and (b)
how this report, if it was false, could have been published and then
left uncorrected for almost three years (182).
71. The claim that the FAA did not set up a teleconference until 9:20 that morning (183).
72. The omission of the fact that a memo by Laura Brown of the FAA
says that its teleconference was established at about 8:50 and that it
included discussion of Flight 175's hijacking (183-84, 186).
73. The claim that the NMCC teleconference did not begin until 9:29 (186-88).
74. The omission, in the Commission's claim that Flight 77 did not
deviate from its course until 8:54, of the fact that earlier reports
had said 8:46 (189-90).
75. The failure to mention that the report that a large jet had
crashed in Kentucky, at about the time Flight 77 disappeared from FAA
radar, was taken seriously enough by the heads of the FAA and the FBI's
counterterrorism unit to be relayed to the White House (190).
76. The claim that Flight 77 flew almost 40 minutes through
American airspace towards Washington without being detected by the
military's radar (191-92).
77. The failure to explain, if NORAD's earlier report that it was
notified about Flight 77 at 9:24 was "incorrect," how this erroneous
report could have arisen, i.e., whether NORAD officials had been lying
or simply confused for almost three years (192-93).
78. The claim that the Langley fighter jets, which NORAD had
previously said were scrambled to intercept Flight 77, were actually
scrambled in response to an erroneous report from an (unidentified) FAA
controller at 9:21 that Flight 11 was still up and was headed towards
Washington (193-99).
79. The claim that the military did not hear from the FAA about the
probable hijacking of Flight 77 before the Pentagon was struck
(204-12).
80. The claim that Jane Garvey did not join Richard Clarke's videoconference until 9:40, after the Pentagon was struck (210).
81. The claim that none of the teleconferences succeeded in
coordinating the FAA and military responses to the hijackings because
"none of [them] included the right officials from both the FAA and the
Defense Department"---although Richard Clarke says that his
videoconference included FAA head Jane Garvey as well as Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers, the acting chair of the
joint chiefs of staff (211).
82. The Commission's claim that it did not know who from the
Defense Department participated in Clarke's videoconference---although
Clarke's book said that it was Donald Rumsfeld and General Myers
(211-212).
83. The endorsement of General Myers' claim that he was on Capitol
Hill during the attacks, without mentioning Richard Clarke's
contradictory account, according to which Myers was in the Pentagon
participating in Clarke's videoconference (213-17).
84. The failure to mention the contradiction between Clarke's
account of Rumsfeld's whereabouts that morning and Rumsfeld's own
accounts (217-19).
85. The omission of Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta's
testimony, given to the Commission itself, that Vice-President Cheney
and others in the underground shelter were aware by 9:26 that an
aircraft was approaching the Pentagon (220).
86. The claim that Pentagon officials did not know about an
aircraft approaching Pentagon until 9:32, 9:34, or 9:36---in any case,
only a few minutes before the building was hit (223).
87. The endorsement of two contradictory stories about the aircraft
that hit the Pentagon---one in which it executed a 330-degree downward
spiral (a "high-speed dive") and another in which there is no mention
of this maneuver (222-23).
88. The claim that the fighter jets from Langley, which were
allegedly scrambled to protect Washington from "Phantom Flight 11,"
were nowhere near Washington because they were mistakenly sent out to
sea (223-24).
89. The omission of all the evidence suggesting that the aircraft that hit the Pentagon was not Flight 77 (224-25).
90. The claim that the military was not notified by the FAA about
Flight 93's hijacking until after it crashed (227-29, 232, 253).
91. The twofold claim that the NMCC did not monitor the
FAA-initiated conference and then was unable to get the FAA connected
to the NMCC-initiated teleconference (230-31).
92. The omission of the fact that the Secret Service is able to know everything that the FAA knows (233).
93. The omission of any inquiry into why the NMCC initiated its own
teleconference if, as Laura Brown of the FAA has said, this is not
standard protocol (234).
94. The omission of any exploration of why General Montague
Winfield not only had a rookie (Captain Leidig) take over his role as
the NMCC's Director of Operations but also left him in charge after it
was clear that the Pentagon was facing an unprecedented crisis
(235-36).
95. The claim that the FAA (falsely) notified the Secret Service
between 10:10 and 10:15 that Flight 93 was still up and headed towards
Washington (237).
96. The claim that Vice President Cheney did not give the
shoot-down authorization until after 10:10 (several minutes after
Flight 93 had crashed) and that this authorization was not transmitted
to the US military until 10:31 (237-41).
97. The omission of all the evidence indicating that Flight 93 was shot down by a military plane (238-39, 252-53).
98. The claim that Richard Clarke did not receive the requested shoot-down authorization until 10:25 (240).
99. The omission of Clarke's own testimony, which suggests that he received the shoot-down authorization by 9:50 (240).
100. The claim that Cheney did not reach the underground shelter
(the PEOC [Presidential Emergency Operations Center]) until 9:58
(241-44).
101. The omission of multiple testimony, including that of Norman
Mineta to the Commission itself, that Cheney was in the PEOC before
9:20 (241-44).
102. The claim that shoot-down authorization must be given by the president (245).
103. The omission of reports that Colonel Marr ordered a shoot-down
of Flight 93 and that General Winfield indicated that he and others at
the NMCC had expected a fighter jet to reach Flight 93 (252).
104. The omission of reports that there were two fighter jets in
the air a few miles from NYC and three of them only 200 miles from
Washington (251).
105. The omission of evidence that there were at least six bases
with fighters on alert in the northeastern part of the United States
(257-58).
106. The endorsement of General Myers' claim that NORAD had defined
its mission in terms of defending only against threats from abroad
(258-62).
107. The endorsement of General Myers' claim that NORAD had not
recognized the possibility that terrorists might use hijacked airliners
as missiles (262-63).
108. The failure to highlight the significance of evidence
presented in the Report itself, and to mention other evidence, showing
that NORAD had indeed recognized the threat that hijacked airliners
might be used as missiles (264-67).
109. The failure to probe the issue of how the "war games"
scheduled for that day were related to the military's failure to
intercept the hijacked airliners (268-69).
110. The failure to discuss the possible relevance of Operation Northwoods to the attacks of 9/11 (269-71).
111. The claim---made in explaining why the military did not get
information about the hijackings in time to intercept them---that FAA
personnel inexplicably failed to follow standard procedures some 16
times (155-56, 157, 179, 180, 181, 190, 191, 193, 194, 200, 202-03,
227, 237, 272-75).
112. The failure to point out that the Commission's claimed
"independence" was fatally compromised by the fact that its executive
director, Philip Zelikow, was virtually a member of the Bush
administration (7-9, 11-12, 282-84).
113. The failure to point out that the White House first sought to
prevent the creation of a 9/11 Commission, then placed many obstacles
in its path, including giving it extremely meager funding (283-85).
114. The failure to point out that the Commission's chairman, most
of the other commissioners, and at least half of the staff had serious
conflicts of interest (285-90, 292-95).
115. The failure of the Commission, while bragging that it
presented its final report "without dissent," to point out that this
was probably possible only because Max Cleland, the commissioner who
was most critical of the White House and swore that he would not be
part of "looking at information only partially," had to resign in order
to accept a position with the Export-Import Bank, and that the White
House forwarded his nomination for this position only after he was
becoming quite outspoken in his criticisms (290-291).
I will close by pointing out that I concluded my study of what I
came to call "the Kean-Zelikow Report" by writing that it, "far from
lessening my suspicions about official complicity, has served to
confirm them. Why would the minds in charge of this final report engage
in such deception if they were not trying to cover up very high
crimes?" (291)
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